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The only way to sort out the problem 
was ro create the law that will force infor-
mation flow and get the system running. 
Need to ave 
So what could be a solution ro have 
an information system and have data en-
tered into it? First, an absolute necess ity 
is ro have clear, well-defined proced ures 
providing as much data as poss ible and, 
if possible, have ir organized in such a 
way that they can be entered inro an in-
formation system with a lot of predefined 
va lues. In order to emphasize rhe impor-
tance of certain fields, ir is advisable ro 
have some fields that must be entered as 
a condition to proceed. 
Another problem is how to keep the 
entered information. Our experience 
shows that there are rwo solutions: either 
not delete records (just declare them can-
celed) or have well-fo rmed and carefully 
programmed routines for record deletion. 
Over rime and with the expansion of ac-
tivities, it becomes obvious rhar some sort 
of traceability has robe implemented, and 
ideally, there should be a printed journal 
file (log book for major changes). 
A need to have a chance to educate 
and re-educate staff is more related to 
program managers, as they often forger 
the simple fact char one may gain knowl-
edge nor only through trial and error, bur 
also by attending seminars. This is nor 
only more cost-effective, bur it also ere-
ares a sense of importance for the staff 
and in the long run creates a bener envi-
ronment and more effective employees. 
Besides the problems mentioned so 
far, there are also some po ints that sim-
ply can nor be over looked. When the staff 
moves, things are forgotten. Being (at 
least in Bosnia) the first organization in 
place maintaining a live database, the staff 
educated during rhe process become an 
asset desired by other companies. By rule, 
salaries reflect funding, and iris difficult 
ro keep quality staff together. 
Another problem is purely physical: 
paper copies are inclined to disappear or 
get damaged by manipulation. W ith luck 
(from the program's point of view), the 
amount of activities is growing and rhe 
paper archive is growing, which means 
more data to enter. A solut ion would be 
to ~can all the reports and to use the 
scanned images as information carriers. 
Sraremenrs rhar say rhar minefield 
report clara lose their importance with 
time are simply wrong. In the end, they 
become the only wrinen proof of con-
tamination. A survey report, while an 
expert's opi nion, is still just an opinion 
on the possible mine risk for certain areas. 
rioritization and the 
nformation System 
I t is not always easy to find a 
mathematic algorithm to define priori-
ties. Sometimes even scoring does not 
help; for instance, the complicated stare 
structure reflects procedures for priority 
definition. Also, the term "impact" can 
be understood in many d ifferent ways. 
Speaking of complexity, here is a Bosnia 
and Herzegovina state structure equation: 
1 Stare+ [I Entity+ I Entity (I 0 Can-
tons)+ District] = 14 Governments 
Taking into consideration the fact 
char rea l executive autho ri ty lies in mu-
nicipalities (more than 120), it becomes 
obvious why priorities cannot be defined 
based just on some "points." 
Through six years of data collection, 
we learned that where the mines are and 
the real impact of rhem on the popula-
tion and society is the question. The 
problem is that priorities have ro reflect 
needs and be part of plans for develop-
ment as desired by authorities. Otherwise 
ir's simply not working. 
outheastern urope 
pproach 
ln order ro have a broader scope and 
ro share experience with neighboring 
countries, we used an opportunity kindly 
provided by the European Commission 
(EC) to starr a project on regional data shar-
ing. So far, rhe beneficiaries of the project 
are the following countries in southeastern 
Europe (SEE) region: Slovenia, Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, and 
Azerbaijan-and chis list is likely to expand. 
So far, we have sent four exports ro 
the Joint Research Center and informa-
t ion interchange has proven possible. 
Based on data inconsistency, it becomes 
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obvious that some sort of standardization 
has to rake place. Th us, we agreed on 
standard hardware and software packages. 
In order to be able ro show data for the 
region on a single map, we agreed on ba-
sics for use of the satellite images, and we 
have images provided for the region. 
Prior to the information inrerchange, 
we had a fou r-day meeting in Sarajevo 
yielding some information interchange 
core standards for SEE. 1 Based on experi-
ence gained through these activities, 
exported data sent could be harmonized. 
Once a standard for information inter-
change is provided, information can be 
interchanged. An exporting exercise helped 
a lor because some of the mistakes became 
visible. A "house cleaning" was necessary. 
More than that, countries within the re-
g io n are helping each other sorr out 
problems. A good illustration of this is the 
BH MAC's GPS campaign in Albania. 
Since all participants provided data 
without any problems, SEE could be used 
as an example of equali ty in divers ity. In 
f:1ct, once the "one-size-does-not- fi r-all" 
phi losophy was accepted, it was consid-
erably easy to achieve awareness on 
info rmario n-shari ng benefl ts. 
Having seen all aspects ofinformarion 
sharing and cooperation, I think it is rime 
for the Global Information Exchange Stan-
dard for mine action. We fully support rhe 
Mine Action Extensible Markup Language 
(maXML) initiative, which becomes more 
and more accepted as a standard protocol 
for information interchange. • 
Endnotes 
I. Results of the conference can be seen at 
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A New Law, New Structure and New 
Hope in Bosnia 
After years of struggling w ith an inefficient m ine action structure, a new 
demining law has revitalized t he Bosnia-Herzegovina M ine Action Center 
(BHMAC). Bosnians f inally have the means t o conquer their landmine 
troubles. 
by JJ Scott, MAIC 
Introduction 
A new law enacted in March of2002 
marked the beginning of a Bosnian mine 
action renaissance that will improve ev-
erything from na t ional program 
management to individual minefield pro-
cedures. A complete restructuring and 
reorganization of the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Mine Action Center (BHMAC) will fi-
nally aiJow the "head" of Bosnian mine 
action to effectively d irect the bodies be-
neath it, and to responsibly report ro rhe 
govern ment through the Demining 
Commission. The Bosnian government 
formulated the demining law and will 
help fund irs implementation-an ex-
trao rdinary step toward its goal of 
effective national program ownership. 
The new law and the structures it creates 
fi nally give Bosnian mine action practi-
tio ners a management system that is 
attuned to their own culture and unique 
land mine situation- indispensable weap-
ons in the struggle to free their nation 
from the landmines holding it hostage. 
History/War 
Over rhree years of fighting ( 1992-
1995) among several different armies 
along undulating front lines left "a very 
complicated and extensive [landmine] 
problem in a complex envi ronment," says 
Mr. D avid Rowe, Program Manager of 
the United Nations Development Pro-
g ram ( UND P) and adviser to the 
BHMAC, Demining Commission and 
International Board of Donors. Mr. Rowe 
moved ro Bosnia during the war and has 
been involved in Bosnian mine action 
since rhe beginning. He has survived rhe 
BHMAC's progression from mine action 
side-show to center-stage attraction. 
To appreciate the turnaround now 
raking place, some background is neces-
sary. Mr. Rowe describes the mine threat 
left by the war as "quire complex because 
of its extent, because of its low density 
and because of irs random nature," mak-
ing "the landmi ne problem here less 
quantifiable than in other pans of rhe 
world." 
Knowing refugees and imernally dis-
placed persons (lOPs) would soon try 
returning home, rhe United Nations set 
up a mine action center in 1996. The 
inrernarional community decided char 
Bosnians should run their own mine ac-
tion program, handing over all 
responsibilities on July I, 1998. The 
Bosnians inherited a srrucwre rhat was 
"a development program in a l 00 per-
cen r task-o riented en vi ron men r. . . , a 
decision perhaps more designed ro ac-
commod ate polit ical n eeds than 
immediate practical pose-war consider-
ations," says Mr. Rowe. Under char 
structure, the State-level BHMAC was 
essentially subservient to rhe rwo rela-
tively autonomous Entity MACs (one 
representing rhe Federation of Bosnia-
H erzegovina and one for the Republ ic of 
Srbska), effectively preventing it from 
wielding any real managerial influence 
over demining operations. Many in 
Bosnia feel that the United Nations 
handed the program over to Bosnian au-
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rhorities a bit roo early, before either rhe 
MAC or the Bosnian government was 
ready. 
By late 2000, a budget crisis created 
and exacerbated by allegations of corrup-
tion and mis at the 
-.-..~~~ 
A BHMAC truck waits behind the BHMAC 
headquarters, beside the Marshal Tito 
Barracks . 
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ELS'"Beaver" exits a 
minefield just 
outside of Sarajevo. 
levels left the three MACs on the verge 
of collapse. Demining and surveying op-
erations slowed dramatically. ln a drastic 
(bur nor completely uncalled for) move, 
rhe High Representative dismissed the 
three-man Demining Commission, cit-
ing corruption and misuse of influence. 
lr was a highly visible symptom of the 
otherwise shadowy affliction lurking 
through government corridors, covertly 
sapping rhe MACs' dedicated staffs of 
their ability to manage life-saving mine 
action activities-the organization's ulti-
mate mandate. Mr. Rowe feels "rhe 
national ream should be commended for 
keeping rhe show alive and going for-
ward-albeit slowly" during rhis period. 
NewHope 
"Sometimes th ings have to be at rhe 
brink of collapse-it has robe very clear 
to all involved that things are not well-
before you can get positive change and 
head in the right direction," Mr. Rowe 
remarks, looking back at that critical pe-
riod. The Bosnian government realized 
rhar much of irs economic, health care, 
infrastructure and redevelopment woes 
were related to leftover landmines, and 
they finally made a concerted effort to 
address the problem with a logical, legiti-
mately Bosnian solution. The Bosnian 
mine action structure needed replace-
ment, nor refurbishment, and in early 
200 I work starred on a law rhar would 
create a new, tenable organization. W ith 
considerable foreign encouragement, law-
makers hashed our the derails over rhe 
next few months, and the legislature ap-
proved Bosnia's landmark Demining Law 
in March 2002. 
Management Level 
The law central ized management 
and development functions-formerly 
shared and/or fought over by rhe two 
Enriry MACs-wirhin the BH MAC, 
leaving day-to-day operational decisions 
ro subordinate offices in Sarajevo (the 
Federation) and Banja Luka (the Repub-
lic). Mr. Dusan Gavran, newly appointed 
Direcror of the BHMAC, believes that 
this new arrangement will yield several 
tangible benefits: "Before , rhe entity gov-
ernments dictated priorities. Nothing was 
coordinated. Now, one ministry-level de-
partment will rule over the rwo 
governments. The Entity governments 
will submit priorities, and all informa-
tion will be concentrated in one spot. The 
Bosnian council of ministers will then 
decide the priorities." This should in-
crease commun ication and cooperation 
between the Entities and rhe BHMAC, 
bur if they can't reach an agreement on 
priorities, the central BHMAC will al-
ways have the last word. 
Since most functions previously car-
ried our by the Entity MACs are now 
under the BH MAC's jurisdiction, many 
people had to update their business cards 
as their jobs, offices and/or rides changed. 
"Often, the person who was performing 
a certain function simply transferred that 
funct ion to a new system, perhaps nor 
even in a new office," remarks Mr. Rowe. 
He adds, "This was nor designed to be a 
great purge of people. Ir was designed to 
set up rhe centralized structure necessary 
to formulate and man age nat ional 
[demining] policy."Therefore, "when rhe 
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dust settles, we may end up with abour 
rhe same number of people, the differ-
ence being the way in which rhey work 
with in a single cooperative body. " By re-
taining a core of experienced workers, the 
BHMAC will accompl ish more than just 
conserve pink sli ps. Long-rime employ-
ees know what they're doing, have 
endured t rying rimes, and rhus constitute 
a priceless Bosnian mine action asset. 
Prior ro his arrival at rhe BHMAC, Mr. 
Gavran heard that "the BHMAC had 
insufficient technical staff, that there were 
no experts there." After a few weeks on 
the job, he saw rhar his staff was so expe-
rienced, "they have become experts," even 
without special training. Those appren-
tices-turned-masters will help lead rhe 
Bosnian mine action revolution from rhe 
rop. 
Operational Level 
The redesigned BHMAC and irs 
subservient Entity offices are already be-
ginning the ir work, and Mr. Rowe 
exp ects to see "some considerable ad-
vances fairly quickly, especially in the area 
of long-term strategy and management 
of rhe annual work plans." Mine action 
requires a good roadmap; rhe new 
BHMAC can provide rhar. Bur a map 
doesn't help anyone when used incor-
rectly. Planning and management are 
important, bur nothing is accomplished 
if no one carries our rhe operation cor-
reedy. 
Demining in Bosnia has nor been 
ineffective; on the contrary, Mr. Rowe feels 
"rhe basic operational strucrure has per-
formed reasonably well. " He cominues, 
"What we real ly have in Bosnia is a com-
petency to hand le one of rhe elemems of 
mine action: clearance. lr's rhe main ele-
ment, bur we particularly need ro 
improve even that, and we need better 
results from rhe survey process." General 
goals for rhe operational level include 
improvements in survey and inspection 
(quality assurance), as well as a better 
mine risk education program and more 
thorough minefield marking. Marking 
and barriers are especially important in 
Bosnia, because as Mr. Rowe points our, 
"some of these [mine] fields aren't going 
to be cleared for a very long time." 
According coM r. Gavran, "deminers 
and com panies do honor the [current] 
standards, bur there are differences. Be-
fore, rhe entities made their own 
standards. Now, we want [everyone) to 
conform to world standards." He believes 
char surveyors and inspectors especially 
muse follow identical standards, designed 
and enforced by rhe BHMAC. O ffic ials 
need to know exacrly what a surveyor re-
gards as a low- or high-risk area, how he 
dercrmines rhe presence and s ize of a 
mine-suspected area, and rhe methodol-
ogy used to reach those conclusions so 
rhey can properly prioritize demining 
projects and demarcate fields rhar won't 
soon be cleared. The standardization of 
inspectors hardly needs explaining: offi-
cials (and civilians) need to know what 
an inspector means when he recommends 
certification of land as cleared and how 
he judged ir so. Did he rake some mine-
detecting dogs through rhe field, or run 
a machine over it, or play hopscotch 
down the middle of it? Mr. Gavran feels 
that in the past, "every (inspector) has 
added or omitted something" on his/her 
reports, leaving uncenainty where none 
should be. For inspectors and surveyors, 
any miscommun ication m ight cause 
landmine casualties. 
Mr. Rowe insists, "No dramatic [op-
erational) changes have been pur into 
effect, and there's absolutely no reason 
why they should immediately be," since 
operations do in fact function at a rea-
sonably efficient level, ar least compared 
ro rhe management structures being over-
hauled right now. For now, managemem 
problems are more urgent than opera-
tional, and winter will soon hair most 
operations anyway, giving rhe BHMAC 
plenty of rime ro draw up new standards 
and priorities and whatever else they de-
termine necessary. 
The donor community has shown 
keen interest in recent events, as they 
should-despite much progress; Bosn ia 
sti ll requires heavy financial aid to pull 
off their mine action miracle. Ir is cer-
tainly roo soon ro declare corruption in 
Bosnia extinct, bur we can safely place ir 
on the endangered list for now, as Mr. 
Gavran promises to prove the BHMAC's 
trustworthiness through transparency: 
"The door of the MAC is open to every-
one involved in demining in rhe world," 
he declared, ushering in a new level of 
information sharing between the MAC 
and irs donors. 
iffering Roles 
In rhe meantime, demining goes on. 
Commercial companies, non-govern-
memal organizations (NGOs), rhe Emiry 
armies, and Civil Protection forces all 
execute demining activities in Bosnia. 
Each has irs own role, bur in general in-
te rnationally funded companies and 
NGOs clear most minefields in civilian 
areas, the armies conduct their own 
projects in accordance with national pri-
orities, and Civil Protection completes a 
small-bur increasing-percentage of 
demining activities. Once Bosnia is de-
clared free from the effects of mines, Civil 
Protection and Army forces will rake the 
lead role, cleaning up residual minefields 
and responding co emergencies as neces-
sary. Understanding each demining asset's 
strengths and weaknesses is integral co 
undersranding Bosnian demining. 
NGOs 
NGOs complete a large percentage 
of the demining tasks in Bosnia each year. 
They are independently funded (no 
Bosnian government support), relatively 
stable organizations. Many are foreign 
charity groups. The BHMAC has nodi-
rect control over NGOs, save task 
allocation, quality control and accredita-
tion. Srill, NGOs typically cry ro act in 
rhe nation's best interest, acceding to rhe 
BHMAC's wishes- when their donors 
have rhe same wishes. Mr. Stephen Bryanr 
is rhe Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) pro-
gram manager for Bosnian operations. 
NPA is a major NGO in Bosnia, main-
raining a sraffof about 200 Bosnians (and 
three ex-pars, including Mr. Bryant) as 
they help build local capacity, reach man-
agement skills, develop infrastructure-and 
do big-rime demining throughout rhe 
country. NPA's involvement in Bosn ia is 
typical of many NGOs, and also repre-
sents something of an ideal: NPA 
maintains an excellent reputation by 
regularly achieving irs goals, which de-
lights their donors and draws more 
donations, allowing rhem to set even 
more ambitious goals. NPA's Bosnia op-
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erarion is a long-term development pro-
gram that will total about II years. 
Significantly, they're about to hand over 
demining operations in the Republic of 
Srbska to Civil Protection. The transition 
has begun. 
Commercial Companies 
Commercial companies often spe-
cialize in one area of demining, allowing 
them to complete tasks for less money 
than general demining organizations. An 
econom isr would say rhar specialized 
companies have a comparative advantage 
over other groups in their focus area. An 
NGO, the government or even another 
company often hires a commercial com-
pany to complete a specific segment of a 
larger job, saving the client money. 
Demining companies' concern for the 
bottom line leads to dynamic, innovative 
and cosr-effecrive solutions to rough 
problems. European Land mine Solutions 
(ELS) is a company rhar focuses on me-
chan ical area preparation. When hired, 
Drivers show great 
pride in their 
machines and their 
jobs. 
2
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ELS operators rest 
beside an NPA 
truck. A large 
graveyard sprawls 
in the distance. 
they drive huge armored flails back and 
fonh over a minefield, bearing the ground 
wirh rotating chains to remove all vegeta-
tion. That's it-no clearance, no survey, 
just men with huge machines clearing rhe 
way for manual deminers or dogs to fo l-
low. Thorough area preparation removes 
annoying brush from deminers' paths and, 
more importantly, triggers any tripwires 
straddling the minefield. In Bosnia, near-
invisible tripwire filamems often lead to 
a nasty Yugoslav mine called the PROM-
1. When activated, the PROM-l 's 
explosive charge shoots upward about 
four feet before detonating, spraying 
shrapnel over a much wider area than 
conventional blast mines. Deminers re-
ally appreciate ELS' services. 
The ELS business model requires 
heavy input from Bosnian workers, de-
pending on savvy locals co help the 
company improve its operations. Accord-
ing to Mr. Paul Simmons, ELS' Bosnian 
office manager, local crews operate and 
maintain all of ELS' equipment, learn-
ing everything there is to know about 
each machine. Then, when demining 
operations cease during the winter 
months, these same crews give ELS rec-
ommendations for improving their 
machines, often doing much of the work 
themselves. Mr. Simmons added that his 
crews included Serbs, C roats, Bosnians, 
Muslims, Catholics-groups who were at 
each others' throats just seven years ago 
now hang out together at the ELS garage 
all winter, trading tool rips and shop talk. 
Entity Armies/Civil Protection 
Immediately after the war, only the 
Entity armies had any idea where mines 
mighr be- they laid many of them, after 
all. They were the first wave of demining 
activity in Bosnia. The armies' work was 
more militarily strategic than humanitarian, 
and international NGOs and commercial 
companies soon superseded them, bur their 
discipline, knowledge and decent equipment 
make them valuable assets nonetheless. As 
the NGOs and commercial companies 
slowly migrate to other demining 
hotspots, rhe Entity armies may see their 
demining workload increase. 
The armies may pick up some of the 
demining work, but they have othe r 
tasks-such as defending the counrry. 
Most demining wi ll eventually fall on 
Civil Protection forces, Bosnia's indig-
enous, civilian-run enforcement squads. 
Right now, Civi l Protection undertakes 
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a relatively small proportion of the work, 
bur in the future, when most priority 
minefields are cleared, Civil Protection 
will conduct needed spot demining and 
emergency calls whenever needed. In the 
end, Bosnians will have only Bosnians 
demining their nation: the triumphant 
endgame of the Bosnian battle against 
landmines. 
Conclusion 
In Bosnia, there hasn't been much 
difference between a realist and a cynic, 
since neither had anything positive to say 
about the future-until now. Suddenly, 
optimists are respectable people again. 
Mr. Rowe knows better than anyone the 
reasons why: "We have a new manage-
ment ream already in place-there's 
finally a real chance for stability. And the 
government, with all irs difficult circum-
stances, has begun to pick up its 
responsibilities-chat shows it's inrerested 
in getting on with business." For the first 
rime since independence, the Bosnian 
government has conceived and executed 
a plan-the Demining Law-that paves 
the way for the resolution of a Bosnian 
problem using a Bosnian system that will 
evemually rely entirely on national re-
sources. "It's fairly simple, actually," Mr. 
Rowe explains. "We are at the point 
where the Bosnians can really take the 
lead in solving their problems, and that's 
always the best way to go!" • 
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Freedom in Afghanistan 
The U.S. and Coalition forces' occupation of airfields at Bagram and 
Kandahar in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom was initially 
hampered by the presence of a large number of mines and UXO in both the 
immediate and surrounding areas of the airfields. U.S. and Coalition forces 
quickly came to understand that traditional countermine demining 
operations were insufficient to ensure troop habitability and operational 
safety in the base area, a situation not foreseen or provided for in current 
U.S. Army doctrine. This experience strongly suggests that the U.S. Army 
should assess its current countermine doctrine and introduce a doctrinal 
modification to take into account the future need to deal with mines and 
UXO in and around base areas. 
by John L. Wilkinson, Vice 
President, Operations, RONCO 
Consulting Corporation 
Introduction 
In many ways, Operation Enduring 
Freedom has diverged from the usual pat-
tern of U.S. and Coalition military 
operations that developed since the Viet-
nam War. Whether small-scale operations 
such as Urgem Fury in Grenada or Just 
Cause in Panama, or much larger-scale op-
era tions such as Desert Shield/Desert 
Srorm in the Gulf or Allied Force in Serbia, 
the usual pattern since the 1970s has been 
one of mounting operations imo enemy 
territory from friendly territory, and the 
usual pattern has been not to occupy en-
emy territory for extended periods of rime. 
While Operation Enduring Freedom 
began as did the others mentioned above, 
with the collapse of the Taliban govern-
ment, Marine, U.S. Army and Coalition 
forces occupied Bagram and Kandahar air-
fields inside Afghanistan. Both have since 
been used as semi-permanent operational 
bases from which to conduct further mili-
tary operations against the remnants ofAI 
Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan 
and adjoining border areas with Pakistan. 
This change of pattern may well be-
come more of the norm as the war against 
terrorism progresses and U.S. and Coalition 
forces find themselves operating with increas-
ing frequency from bases that are not 
necessarily in friendly or non-conflictive ter-
ritory. As a result, and based on the experience 
since February 2002 in Afghanistan, the U.S. 
Army's doctrine on dealing with mines is 
likely to require revision or, at lease, expan-
sion to account for situations such as those 
encountered in Afghanistan. 
ine Clearance vs. 
emining 
In U.S. Army doctrine, there is a 
clear delineation of responsibility between 
mine clearance operations, which are con-
ducted by the Corps of Engineers, and 
removal and disposal of UXO, which is 
the responsibility of Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD) teams attached to or 
integrated with combat units. Further-
more, there is a clear distinction in doctrine 
between mine clearance and demining; the 
latter, in fact, is nor acknowledged as a 
military mission. 
Army doctrine calls for breaching or 
clearing lines of communication through 
minefields, clearly demarcating the 
cleared borders, and moving through as 
quickly as operationally possible. A cer-
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cain number of casualties are recognized 
as inevitable in such operations. Military 
minefields are usually laid ro channel or 
delay movement, so that direct or indi-
rect fire, or both, can be brought to bear 
on an opposing force that has slowed 
down or is concentrated at certain pre-
determined points as it attempts to traverse 
or avoid the minefield. As a result, Army 
doctrine emphasizes speed in dealing with 
such obstacles so as to engage and defeat 
the enemy directly, while reducing the ex-
posure of units to enemy fire. 
At this poim, it is useful to note that 
Army doctrine on mine clearance contin-
ues co reflect readiness for a war of rapid 
movement, such as was expected in Eu-
rope and was carried out in the Gulf War. 
On d1e other hand, demining or hw11anitar-
ian demjning, where the goal is to render 
defined areas mine !Tee or, more properly, mine 
safe, is nor recognized as a military mission in 
doctrine. While it is true that U.S. Special 
Forces personnel receive training in humani-
tarian dernining at Fort Leonard Wood, they 
do so in order to reach it to foreign military 
personnel. In combat, Special Forces do nor 
have demining or humanitarian demining as 
a mission and they do not, indeed, have mine 
clearance as a mission either. 
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